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Abstract
We consider exporters’ strategic choice of whether to comply with rules of origin (ROO) in a free
trade area (FTA). While the existing literature of ROO considers models of perfect or monopolistic
competition, we consider an oligopolistic trade model. Our model consists of three ﬁnal-good
producers—one in an importing country and two in an exporting country—and one intermediate-
good producer, which is in the importing country and has monopoly power. We show that, within
the range of parameter values for which some exporters comply with ROO, the content rate aﬀects
the output of the ﬁnal-good producer in the importing country and the country’s social welfare in an
U-shaped fashion. The content rate levels that allow the coexistence of compliers and non-compliers
minimize social welfare.
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In a free trade area (FTA), to distinguish between intraregional trade and outside trade, rules of origin
(ROO) are required in such areas and, in fact, most of the FTAs have introduced some kind of ROO.
1 To enjoy duty-free access to a member country’s market within an FTA, ﬁnal-good producers must
include a minimum fraction of intermediate-goods produced within the area. Thus, ROO is essentially
similar to local content requirements (LCRs). 2 ROO limits the use of inputs produced outside the
region, so it serves as a protecting device for less eﬃcient countries. 3
In an FTA, exporters are imposed with an external tariﬀ upon exporting to the member country’s
market if they do not comply with ROO, so all exporters inside an FTA choose whether to comply
with the ROO or not. There are exporters which comply with ROO but there are exporters which do
not. For example, an empirical study conducted by Anson et al. (2005) points out that only 64% of
exporters meet the ROO requirement in Mexico (i.e., NAFTA). 4
The purpose of the paper is to consider the choice of exporters in an international Cournot oligopoly.
The existing literature of ROO that focuses on the choice of exporters assumes perfect competition and
monopolistic competition. In contrast to the existing literature, we introduce monopoly power of the
intermediate-good producer and strategy among exporters.
To capture the roles of monopoly power of the intermediate-good producer and strategy among
exporters, we present an oligopolistic trade model with ROO. 5 There is an FTA consisted of two
countries—one with a ﬁnal-good market (called the importing country) and one without (called the
1 At least 87 regional trade areas (RTAs, including FTAs) have some type of ROO. See WTO (2002).
2 LCR is the policy that imposes to entrant foreign ﬁrms a certain ratio of the procurement of local inputs to produce
a ﬁnal product locally (Hara and Nakanishi, 2001). Note that LCR policy crucially diﬀers from ROO. These two
regulations have diﬀerent purposes. To protect the domestic producer (especially, intermediate good producers), LCR
is employed in an FDI host country. ROO is imposed to the intra-region ﬁrm which wills to gain duty-free access in
an RTA.
3 For example, see Krueger (1993), Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1996), Rodriguez (2001), Falvey and Reed (2002), and
Takauchi (2010a). A Common feature of these studies are to emphasize a protecting nature of ROO. They generally
adopt analytical framework of the local content protection model. Krueger (1993) points out that, using a numer-
ical example, ROO possibly protect the U.S. auto and textile industries in NAFTA. Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1996)
suggested that ROO has two eﬀects, rent-shifting and anti-competitive eﬀects, in an imperfect competitive market.
Also, Rodriguez (2001) employs multistage production model and examines trade-creating eﬀect between FTA member
countries. Although these studies mainly examine the eﬀects of ROO’s introduction and strengthening as a singular
policy variable, Falvey and Reed (2002) and Takauchi (2010a) examine the relationship between ROO and other trade
policies. Falvey and Reed (2002) examine the relationship between the ﬁnal good importing country’s tariﬀ policy and
ROO. Takauchi (2010a) mainly considers the policy interaction between ROO and the ﬁnal good exporting country’s
subsidy/tax policies.
4 Similarly, Hayakawa et al. (2009) indicates that utilization rate of ROO is not 100% in ASEAN countries. This fact
also implies that compliers and non-compliers coexist.
5 There is an another study that uses an oligopolistic trade model with ROO. Ishikawa et al. (2007) mainly considers a
three-country Bertrand competition. However, they ommits the intermediate good market, focuses on the ﬁnal good,
and assumes the price-discrimination behavior of ﬁrms that produce a ﬁnal good originating outside of the FTA.
1exporting country). There is one intermediate-good producer and one ﬁnal-good producer in the im-
porting country. There are two ﬁnal-good exporters in the exporting country. The ﬁnal-good producer
in the importing country exclusively uses the domestic intermediate good. To enjoy duty-free access, the
exporters must use at least some amount of the intermediate good produced within the FTA, otherwise,
they must pay the external tariﬀ.
In this environment, we consider the following three-stage game: First, the exporters choose whether
to comply with ROO or not. Second, the intermediate-good producer in the importing country mo-
nopolistically sets the price. Last, the ﬁnal good producer in the importing country and the exporters
compete ` a la Cournot in the importing country’s market.
Our model oﬀers three main results. First, for some combinations of the content rate of ROO and the
external tariﬀ rate, the equilibrium is such that one exporter complies with ROO while the other does
not, which we call the “mixed regime.” A key to this result is that the price of the local intermediate-
good depends on whether the rival exporter complies with ROO. If the rival complies, it has to procure
the intermediate good from the local producer. This raises the price of the local intermediate good,
which makes it expensive for the exporter to comply with ROO. Conversely, if the rival chooses not to
comply, it lowers the price of the intermediate good and makes it cheaper for the exporter to comply.
This strategic substitution between exporters produces a mixed-regime equilibrium.
Second, we consider the relationship between the importing country’s welfare and the content rate.
We show that the content rate that induces a mixed-regime equilibrium is the worst policy for the
importing country. A key to this result is a trade-oﬀ between the local intermediate-good producer’s
proﬁts and tariﬀ revenues from non-complying exporters. As the content rate goes up, the tariﬀ revenues
go up since the number of non-complying exporters goes up. On the other hand, the proﬁt of the local
intermediate-good producer goes down as the content rate goes up, since the producer’s monopoly
power goes down as the number of complying exporters goes down. Once the content rate reaches the
level where one exporter switches to non-compliance, the monopoly rent of the local intermediate-good
producer drops sharply since the monopoly price drops sharply.
This result is explained by the following logic. When regime shifts from all-compliers regime to
mixed regime, the demand for the local intermediate good decreases and it becomes ﬂatter. If the price
of the local intermediate good is high, the decrease in demand is large. This is because, cost diﬀerences
between complier and non-complier is large. In a mixed regime the demand for the local intermediate
good is more elastic, so the price of the good becomes a cheaper. Since the number of complying
2exporter is half and the price of the local intermediate good falls, in a mixed regime the proﬁt of the
local intermediate-good producer decreases to less than half compared to that in all-compliers regime.
Third, we show that, within a regime where at least some exporters comply, the content rate aﬀects
the output of the ﬁnal-good producer in the importing country in an U-shaped fashion. The direct
aﬀect of the content rate is to raise the exporters’ costs. In ordinal Cournot games, if the rivals’ costs
go up, your own output goes up. Hence, one might think that a rise in the content rate always increases
the output of the local ﬁnal-good producer. In our model, however, a rise in the content rate may
reduce the output of the local ﬁnal-good producer, if the content rate is low. The reason is that, as the
content rate goes up, the demand for the local intermediate good goes up, raising its price. This means
higher costs for both the local producer and the exporter. But, if the content rate is low, exporters
do not suﬀer much from it since they do not need to procure much of the intermediate good from the
local supplier. Thus, the local producer suﬀers more than exporters from the higher price of the local
intermediate good, thereby the local producer reduces its output.
In the above mentioned regimes, the social welfare of the importing country is U-shaped with respect
to the content rate. The shape of the social welfare is determined by the proﬁt of the local ﬁnal-good
producer. The reason is explained by the trade-oﬀ between consumer surplus and the proﬁt of the
local intermediate-good producer. An increase in the content rate increases the proﬁt of the local
intermediate-good producer but decreases the consumer surplus, and these two eﬀects oﬀset each other.
Thus, when the content rate changes, a change in the social welfare mainly depends on the change in
the local ﬁnal-good producer’s proﬁt.
We obtain the following policy implication: When the combinations of the content rate of ROO and
the external tariﬀ rate cause a mixed regime, it is desirable for the importing country within the FTA
to reduce the external tariﬀ. The reason depends on the following two points. First, a policy which
can be individually changed by the importing country is the external tariﬀ of that country. Second,
the welfare in a non-mixed regime where all exporters do not comply is the best for the country and in
that regime the social welfare of the importing country is monotonically increasing with respect to the
external tariﬀ. Therefore, the most desirable policy for the importing country is to impose the highest
tariﬀ level which does not cause a mixed regime.
Here, we relate our model to the existing literature. There are several studies on ROO, which
emphasize the protecting nature of ROO (For example, see Krueger, 1993; Lopez-de-Silanes et al.,
1996; Rodriguez, 2001; Falvey and Reed, 2002; and Takauchi, 2010a). While these existing studies
3mainly assume that exporters comply with ROO, Ju and Krishna (2005) and Demidova and Krishna
(2008) focus on the choice of exporters. 6 Ju and Krishna (2005) examines that, in a model of three-
country perfect competition, all regimes arise depending on the level of the intermediate-good price.
Demidova and Krishna (2008) introduces Melitz-type ﬁrm heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003) and shows that
the mixed regime arises depending on the content rate of the ROO. The reason is that ﬁrms have
diﬀerent productivity. However, in their studies, the eﬀects of the ROO requirement and the external
tariﬀ on the social welfare of the importing country are not considered, and the U-shaped relationship
between the content rate of ROO and the social welfare of importing country is not found.
A seminal work by Lahiri and Ono (1998, 2003), a study on the optimal LCR policy under an
oligopolistic market with host country’s unemployment, is also related to our model. Although they
used a similar form as our study in view of LCR, their studies are concerned to FDI policy against
unemployment in the host country and did not consider the situation of FTA with ROO.
The remainder of this paper comprises six sections. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives
the equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 examines the strategic behavior of exporters and its eﬀects for the
other producers. Section 5 examines the welfare implication of the choice of the exporters, and section
6 oﬀers concluding remarks. In this paper, all proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a free trade area (FTA) consisted of two countries: one with a ﬁnal good market and the
other without it. We call a member country with a ﬁnal good market “importing country” and the
other member country without a ﬁnal good market “exporting country.” There are two producers,
namely, an intermediate-good producer (labeled ﬁrm `) and a ﬁnal-good producer (labeled ﬁrm L) in
the importing country. The ﬁrm ` produces an intermediate good for the local market, the ﬁrm L
produces a ﬁnal good and supplies the product to the local ﬁnal-good market. On the other hand,
there are two ﬁnal-good exporters (ﬁrms F or exporters) that export the ﬁnal good from the other
member country within the FTA to the importing country’s ﬁnal good market. Let us suppose that
both exporters face two alternatives: non-compliance with the ROO (labeled NC) and compliance with
6 Also, Rosell´ on (2000) considers a long-term eﬀect of ROO and analyzes it in static and dynamic situations. He
examines the choice of the foreign ﬁrm in static situation (perfect competition in all goods and monopoly in ﬁnal-
good). However, his focus is long-term eﬀects of ROO on the labor income and do not consider monopoly power in
the intermediate-good producer and strategy among ﬁnal-good exporters.
4the ROO (labeled C). To enjoy duty-free access, both exporters must comply with the ROO of the
FTA, that is, they must at least use a predetermined fraction of the intermediate-good produced within
the region (i.e., the importing country), otherwise, they must pay the external tariﬀ.
The inverse demand function of the ﬁnal-good in the importing country is assumed to be linear:
p = a ¡ bY , where Y ´ y + z1 + z2, and a; b are positive constants. The output of ﬁrm L is y, the
outputs of exporter j are zj, j = 1;2.
Our focus is on the input (or procurement) cost of each ﬁrm. Let us assume that each ﬁrm has a
constant marginal cost of production, which is normalized to zero. Note that ﬁrm L mainly procures
intermediate goods from ﬁrm `. We assume that ﬁrm F is relatively more technologically advanced as
compared to ﬁrm L. In other words, ﬁrm F can employ inputs obtained from multiple sources; however,
ﬁrm L can employ inputs obtained only from local sources (ﬁrm `). 7 Thus, the proﬁts of ﬁrms ` and
L are represented by
¼` ´ rLx; (1)
¼L ´ (p ¡ rL) y; (2)
where rL denotes the price of the intermediate-good in the importing country and x denotes the output
of the intermediate-good. Following Lahiri and Ono (1998, 2003), the input cost of exporters that
comply with ROO becomes
µ rL + (1 ¡ µ) r:
A fraction, µ (1 ¸ µ > 0) denotes a content rate of the ROO, which is imposed by the FTA. 8 In the
above equation, r denotes a competitive price of the intermediate good outside the FTA and rL > r
always holds. For a better understanding, we assume that a competitive price of the intermediate-good






(p ¡ ¿) zj if exporter j chooses NC;
(p ¡ µrL) zj if exporter j chooses C;
(3)
where ¿ (¸ 0) denotes the rate of the external tariﬀ in the importing country and j = 1;2.
7 In our model, shipment cost does not have an essential role. Hence, for simplicity, we assume that a shipment cost
does not exist.
8 In our model, µ is an exogenous parameter.
53 Calculating equilibrium outcomes
In this section, we derive the equilibrium outcomes of the following game. Stage 1: The exporters (ﬁrms
F) independently and simultaneously choose either NC or C. Stage 2: Firm ` sets the price of the
local intermediate good, monopolistically. Stage 3: All ﬁnal-good producers (ﬁrm L and two exporters)
compete ` a la Cournot in the ﬁnal good market of the importing country. We use the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. The game solved using backward induction.
In general, the procurement of intermediate good contains an aspect of technology choice. Since
the exporters must procure the intermediate good under a given production technology, the exporters
determine either NC or C in the ﬁrst stage of the game.
First, we derive the equilibrium outcomes in each regime.
I. No-complier regime (NC;NC): From equations (2)–(3), the Cournot competition in the ﬁnal-
good market yields
y =
a + 2¿ ¡ 3rL
4b
; zj =
a + rL ¡ 2¿
4b
; (4)
where j = 1;2. Market clearing condition y = x and equation (1) yield the following derived demand








From equations (1) and (5), the output of intermediate-good is x = (1=8b)(a+2¿). Thus, the equilibrium





Substituting equation (6) into equation (4), we obtain the equilibrium output of each ﬁrm, total supply
































II. All-compliers regime (C;C): From equations (2)–(3), the Cournot competition in the ﬁnal-
good market yields
y =
a ¡ (3 ¡ 2µ)rL
4b
; zj =
a + (1 ¡ 2µ)rL
4b
: (8)




3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2 ¡
4b
3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2 x: (9)
From equations (1) and (9), the output of the intermediate good is x = (a=8b)(1 + 2µ), and the
equilibrium price of the intermediate-good is
rL(C;C) =
a(1 + 2µ)
2(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
: (10)
Substituting equation (10) into equation (8), we obtain the equilibrium output of each ﬁrm, total supply
Y , and price of the ﬁnal-good p in (C;C).
y(C;C) =
3a(1 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
8b(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
; zj(C;C) =
a(7 ¡ 8µ + 4µ2)
8b(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
;
Y (C;C) =
a(17 ¡ 28µ + 20µ2)
8b(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
; p(C;C) =
a(7 ¡ 4µ + 12µ2)





16b(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
:
(11)









, j = 1;2.
III. Mixed regime (C;NC) (and/or (NC;C)): Without loss of generality, by symmetry ex-
porters, we derive the outcomes in (C;NC). From equations (2)–(3), the Cournot competition in the
ﬁnal-good market yields
y =




a + ¿ ¡ (3µ ¡ 1)rL
4b
; and z2 =
a ¡ 3¿ + (1 + µ)rL
4b
: (13)
7The market clearing condition x = y + µz1 yields the following derived demand for the intermediate-
good:
rL =
(a + ¿)(1 + µ)
3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2 ¡
4b
3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2 x: (14)
The output of intermediate-good is x = (1=8b)(a+¿)(1+µ). The equilibrium price of the intermediate-
good becomes as
rL(C;NC) = rL(NC;C) =
(a + ¿)(1 + µ)
2(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
: (15)
Substituting (15) into equations (12) and (13), we obtain the equilibrium output of each ﬁrm, total
supply Y , and price of the ﬁnal-good p in (C;NC) (and (NC;C)).
y(C;NC) = y(NC;C) =
(a + ¿)(3 ¡ 6µ + 7µ2)
8b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
;
z1(C;NC) = z2(NC;C) =
(a + ¿)(7 ¡ 6µ + 3µ2)
8b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
;
z2(C;NC) = z1(NC;C) =
(7 ¡ 2µ + 7µ2) a ¡ (17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2) ¿
8b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
;
Y (C;NC) = Y (NC;C) =
(17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2) a ¡ (7 ¡ 2µ + 7µ2) ¿
8b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
;
p(C;NC) = p(NC;C) =
(a + ¿)(7 ¡ 2µ + 7µ2)
8(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
; and




16b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
:
(16)











In our model, the prohibitive tariﬀ rate depends on the content rate, µ, and it is monotonically
increasing with respect to µ. Hereafter, let us assume the following assumption.





7 ¡ 2µ + 7µ2
17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2 ´ ¿max; (17)
for cases, µ belongs to [0;1].
8When this assumption holds, both exporters (ﬁrms 1 and 2) produce positive (or at least non-negative)
quantities of the ﬁnal good in any of the three regimes. 9
From equations (6), (10), and (14), we immediately ﬁnd the following properties of the local inter-
mediate good price.
Remark 1. (i) Local intermediate good prices in both all-compliers regime and mixed regime are
inverted-U shaped with respect to the content rate; (ii) The proﬁt of the local intermediate good producer
is monotonically increasing with respect to the content rate.
The shape of the local intermediate good prices is depicted in Figure 1.
Inserts Figure 1 here
Why does the price greatly rise in the all-compliers regime? The reason depends on the following
logic. First, in a mixed regime, the number of compliers is half compared to that in the all-compliers
regime. Thus, the demand for the local intermediate good is relatively small. Second, in a mixed regime,
the demand for the local intermediate good is more elastic than that in the all-compliers regime, so
the price of the good in the mixed regime may become cheaper (from equations (9) and (14)). In a
mixed regime, the demand for the local intermediate good rapidly decreases as the price of the local
intermediate good goes up. However, in the all-compliers regime, the demand slowly decreases as the
price goes up. This is because, in a mixed regime, a non-complier exists. Since a non-complier does
not buy the local intermediate good and strategic substitution works in the ﬁnal good market, damages
brought by a rise in the price of the local intermediate good is large. On the other hand, in the
all-compliers regime, there is no non-complier. Since all exporters buy the local intermediate good,
damages brought by a rise in the price of the local intermediate good are moderate.
Next, we consider the relationship between the price of the local intermediate good and the content
rate. In a regime where at least one exporter complies, the price curve of the local intermediate good is
inverted-U shaped with respect to the content rate. This is because, in each regime, the cost of compliers
goes up and the demand for the local intermediate good goes down as the content rate goes up. Since a
higher content rate decreases the demand to the extreme, the local intermediate-good producer slightly
decreases the price of the good in order to increase the proﬁt.
9 The value of equation (17) is always lesser than 7=10.
94 Strategic behavior of the exporters
In this section, we examine strategic behavior of the exporters. From equations (7)–(17), we obtain the
following 2 £ 2 payoﬀ matrix of the exporters.
Inserts Table 1 here
Using the above payoﬀ matrix, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For all cases µ belongs to (0;1], the equilibrium (SPNE) is
I: (C;C) if ° ¸ f2(µ) holds;
II: (NC;NC) if f1(µ) ¸ ° holds; and




51 ¡ 38µ + 39µ2; f2(µ) ´
4µ(1 + 2µ ¡ µ2 + 4µ3)
(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)(17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2)
:
The result of Proposition 1 is depicted in the following Figure 2 (µ-° plane). 10
Inserts Figure 2 here
When the rate of the external tariﬀ is extremely high compared to the ROO requirement, the in-
creased input price caused by compliance with the ROO has no meaning. That is, compliance dominates
non-compliance. Conversely, when the rate of the external tariﬀ is extremely small compared to the
content rate of ROO, no exporter has an incentive to comply with the ROO. In this case, non-compliance
dominates compliance.
However, when the rate of the external tariﬀ is not too high, but not too small compared to the
content rate of ROO, a mixed regime arises. The key to this result is as follows. When the external
tariﬀ is relatively high (° > f1(µ)), each exporter prefers to comply if the rival does not. In this
case, a jump in the input price caused by one exporter’s compliance is no larger than the level of the
external tariﬀ. However, when all exporters comply, a jump in the input price surpasses the level of
the external tariﬀ. Furthermore, when the external tariﬀ is relatively small (f2(µ) > °), each exporter
10 Note that f2(¢) ¸ f1(¢) holds for any cases, µ belongs to [0;1].
10prefers not to comply if the rival does. Although the rate of the external tariﬀ is relatively small, each
exporter tries to pay the external tariﬀ. This is because, if all exporters comply at once, the price of the
intermediate good greatly increases. To prevent rapid increase in the input price and preserve proﬁt,
each exporter pays the external tariﬀ if the rival complies. In an intermediate case (f2(µ) > ° > f1(µ)),
thus, each exporter has an incentive to choose the option that is diﬀerent from the other. This strategic
substitution between two exporters causes a mixed regime.
Next, we examine the proﬁt of the local ﬁnal-good producer. From equations (7)–(16), and fj,
j = 1;2, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For all cases µ (1 ¸ µ > 0) and ° (¿max ¸ ° ¸ 0), the ranking in the proﬁt of local
ﬁnal-good producer is ¼L(NC;NC) ¸ ¼L(C;NC) = ¼L(NC;C) ¸ ¼L(C;C).
Proposition 2 implies the following intuitive mechanism. If all exporters comply, the price of the
local intermediate good becomes suﬃciently high. This rising price eﬀect harms both exporters and the
local ﬁnal-good producer. In the all-compliers regime, all exporters procure a predetermined fraction
µ of the intermediate-good produced in the importing country, and at the same time, they procure
the intermediate good from another source. Since the competitive intermediate good is cheaper than
the local intermediate good, all exporters are more competitive than the local ﬁnal good producer.
Therefore, from the rising price eﬀect in all-compliers regime, the output and proﬁt of the local ﬁnal
good producer are smaller than those in any other regimes.
This result has an interesting meaning. In our model, the local ﬁnal good producer prefers a relatively
smaller protection. That is, the most desirable policy for the local ﬁnal good producer is to reduce the
external tariﬀ from its initial level to f1(µ) when the initial level of the external tariﬀ is larger than
f1(µ). This point is in sharp contrast with the result of an ordinal Cournot competitive trade model.
If some exporters comply, the output and proﬁt of each ﬁnal good producing ﬁrm in each regime is
not necessarily a decreasing function with respect to the content rate. In view of this, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. If at least an exporter complies, the output of the local ﬁnal-good producer is U-shaped
with respect to the content rate of the ROO: (i) In the mixed regime, 46:41% of the content rate is
detrimental to the local ﬁnal good producer. (ii) In the all-compliers regime, 50% of the content rate
prevents the production of the local ﬁnal-good producer.
Immediately, from the above proposition 3, we derive the following corollary.
11Corollary 1. (i) In the all-compliers regime, as the content rate changes, the interests of all ﬁnal good







. (ii) In a mixed regime, as the
content rate changes, the interest between the local ﬁnal good producer and the non-complier move in
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between local ﬁnal-good producer and the complier move in the same direction due to a change in the
content rate.
The above results are depicted in the Figure 3.
Inserts Figure 3 here
Proposition 3 implies an interesting property of the model. This proposition states that in both
all-compliers and a mixed regimes a positive content rate may be detrimental to the local ﬁnal good
producer. For example, in the all-compliers regime, a content rate of the ROO of 50% prevents the
production of the local ﬁnal-good producer.
In an ordinal Cournot competition, an increase in the rival’s cost increases one’s output and proﬁt.
Hence, one might think that an increase in the complier’s cost increases the output and proﬁt of the local
ﬁnal good producer. In fact, the rise in the content rate increases the demand for the local intermediate
good, so the price of the good possibly increases. Both complier and the local ﬁnal-good producer suﬀer
loss from the rising price of the intermediate good. However, in our model, an increase in the content
rate may reduce the output and proﬁt of the local ﬁnal good producer if the content rate is suﬃciently
low. The reason is explained by the cost of ﬁnal good producing ﬁrms. If the content rate is suﬃciently
low, µ < (1=2)(2¡
p
3) ' 0:134, the compliers’ damage brough by a rising price of the local intermediate
good is suﬃciently small. This is because compliers procure the local intermediate good at µ ratio, but,
at the same time, they procure a cheaper intermediate good at 1¡µ ratio. In contrast to the compliers,
the local ﬁnal good producer uses only the local intermediate good. The cost advantage of compliers is
suﬃciently large. Hence, an increased price of the local intermediate good harms the local ﬁnal good
producer much more than compliers, so the output and proﬁt of the compliers go up but the output
and proﬁt of the local ﬁnal-good producer go down as the content rate goes up. When the content rate
is at an intermediate level, (1=2)(2 ¡
p
3 ) · µ · 1=2, the cost advantage of compliers is small. As the
content rate goes up, the cost advantage of compliers goes down. In this case, a rise in the content rate
reduces both the outputs of compliers and the local ﬁnal good producer.
12When the content rate is suﬃciently high, µ > 1=2, the cost diﬀerence between compliers and local
ﬁnal good producer is suﬃciently small. Furthermore, as mentioned in Remark 1, an increased price of
the local intermediate good caused by a rise in the content rate becomes small if the content rate is high.
11 In this case an increase in the content rate does not raise the price of the local intermediate good,
so an increased content rate increases the cost of the complier much more than that of the local ﬁnal
good producer. Thus, the output and proﬁt of the compliers go down but those of the local ﬁnal-good
producer go up as the content rate goes up.
This mechanism is similar to that in mixed regime: (C;NC) and (NC;C). On the other hand, in
a mixed regime, the changing price eﬀect of the local intermediate good is relatively small. This is
because, the number of exporters that buy the local intermediate good is half compared to that in
the all-compliers regime. Thus, diﬀerent from the all-compliers regime, an intermediate content rate
(µ = 2
p
3 ¡ 3 ' 0:4641) does not prevent the production of the local ﬁnal good producer.
5 Welfare implication
In this section, let us compare the importing country’s welfare level among three regimes: (I) No-
complier regime (NC;NC), (II) all-compliers regime (C;C), and (III) mixed regime (C;NC) and/or
(NC;C). The social welfare of the importing country in each regime is given by
W(NC;NC) = CS(NC;NC) + ¼`(NC;NC) + ¼L(NC;NC) + 2¿zj(NC;NC); (18)
W(C;C) = CS(C;C) + ¼`(C;C) + ¼L(C;C); (19)
W(C;NC) = CS(C;NC) + ¼`(C;NC) + ¼L(C;NC) + ¿z2(C;NC); (20)




is the consumer surplus, ¼`(¢) is the proﬁt of the local intermediate-good
producer (ﬁrm `), ¼L(¢) is the proﬁt of the local ﬁnal-good producer (ﬁrm L), and ¿zj(¢) is the tariﬀ
revenue from non-complier. 12 Note that in all-compliers regime, no exporter is imposed the external
tariﬀ. Thus, the tariﬀ revenue vanishes. In addition, W(C;NC) = W(NC;C) always holds.
After comparing the above equations (18)–(20), we obtain the following proposition.
11 Note that if µ > (1=2)(
p
6¡1) ' 0:7247, the price of the local intermediate-good goes down as the content rate goes
up. See Appendix.
12 The welfare level in equilibrium is depicted in the appendix. See equations (A.6)–(A.8).
13Proposition 4. For all cases, µ (1 ¸ µ ¸ 0) and ° (¿max ¸ ° ¸ 0), the ranking in the social welfare of
the importing country is W(NC;NC) > W(C;C) > W(C;NC) = W(NC;C).
We can explain the result of Proposition 4 from two sorces: the proﬁt of the local intermediate-
good producer and tariﬀ revenue from the non-complier. The proﬁt of the local intermediate good
producer and tariﬀ revenue signiﬁcantly change according to regime switching (or change in the content
rate). For example, for a given external tariﬀ ¿, as the content rate goes up, the tariﬀ revenues
increase since the number of non-complier increases. However, the proﬁt of the local intermediate good
producer goes down as the content rate goes up since the producer’s monopoly power goes down as the
number of compliers goes down. Once the content rate reaches the level where one exporter switches
to non-compliance (on the point which is given by solving ¿ = f2(µ) with µ), the proﬁt of the local
intermediate-good producer drops sharply since the price of the good drops sharply. The relationship
between the proﬁt of the local intermediate good producer and the content rate is depicted in Figure 4.
Inserts Figure 4 here
The sharp drop of the price in the local intermediate good is based on the elasticity of the demand
for the local intermediate good. As mentioned in Remark 1, in a mixed regime, the demand for the
local intermediate good is half since a non-complier exists. Furthermore, there is a non-complier, so an
increased price of the good reduces demand much more than in an all-compliers regime. This demand
diﬀerences between a mixed regime and an all-compliers regime goes up as the content rate goes up.
Since the content rate where one exporter switches to non-compliance is at an intermediate level, the
demand diﬀerences between a mixed regime and an all-compliers regime are suﬃciently large and at
that level the price sharply drops.
What policy implication we obtain? In general, a policy that can be individually changed by a
member country within an FTA is the external tariﬀ in that country. Since it is diﬃcult for a single
member country to change the content rate of the ROO, here we focus on the relationship between the
welfare of the importing country and the external tariﬀ of that country.




as the tariﬀ rate goes up
because in the interval a no-complier regime holds and a higher tariﬀ rate suﬃciently increases the proﬁts
of local intermediate good and ﬁnal good producers. On the other hand, the welfare level suddenly
drops when the tariﬀ rate exceeds f1(µ). This is because, a mixed regime arises if the tariﬀ rate exceeds
f1(µ). Although in a mixed regime the welfare level goes up as the tariﬀ rate goes up, all the levels of
14the welfare in this regime fall below those in other regimes. Further, if the tariﬀ rate reaches f2(µ), the
welfare level jumps up. Since in an all-compliers regime no exporter pays the external tariﬀ, the welfare
level is a constant for the tariﬀ rate on the interval [f2(µ);¿max).
From Proposition 2, the proﬁt of the local ﬁnal good producer drops as the number of compliers
go up. Therefore, the welfare of the importing country and the proﬁt of local ﬁnal good producer are
maximized at the highest tariﬀ rate that does not cause a mixed regime. This result is depicted in
Figure 5.
Inserts Figure 5 here
Summarizing the above consideration, we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The most desirable policy for the importing country and the local ﬁnal good producer
is the same, which is to impose the highest tariﬀ rate that does not cause a mixed regime.
Finally, let us consider the relationship between the welfare level of the importing country and the
content rate in both all-compliers and mixed regimes. Similar to the output and proﬁt of the local
ﬁnal-good producer, the welfare function of the importing country is non-monotonic with respect to
the content rate. Diﬀerentiating equations (19) and (20) with respect to µ, we establish the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. If at least an exporter complies, the social welfare of the importing country is U-shaped
with respect to the content rate of ROO: (i) In all-compliers regime, the bottom of the social welfare for
content rate is µ = 1=2. (ii) In a mixed regime, the bottom of the social welfare for content rate is g(µ),
where g(µ) ´ (¡7 + 21µ ¡ 27µ2 + 15µ3 + 6µ4)=(¡17 ¡ 5µ + 27µ2 ¡ 31µ3 + 18µ4).
Proposition 6 shows that in the worst regime the social welfare of the importing country has a
bottom. Similar to the proﬁt of the local ﬁnal-good producer, the social welfare is U-shaped with
respect to the content rate in both all-compliers and mixed regimes. Since an increased content rate
increases the cost of compliers and decreases production eﬃciency, the total output of the ﬁnal good
goes down as the content rate goes up. 13 Since the total output of the ﬁnal good decreases, the
consumer surplus always goes down as the content rate goes up. Conversely, as shown in Remark 1, the
proﬁt of the local intermediate good producer goes up as the content rate goes up. Hence, an increased
13 This eﬀect of the content rate is called as “anti-competitive eﬀect of ROO.” For example, see Lopez-de-Silanes et al.
(1996) and Takauchi (2010a).
15content rate decreases the consumer surplus but it increases the proﬁt of the local supplier. As a result,
a major part of these two eﬀects oﬀset each other and a change in the social welfare mainly depends on
the change in the proﬁt of the local ﬁnal good producer.
In a mixed regime, the above mechanism basically holds. However, in a mixed regime, tariﬀ revenue
exists. Since for a given external tariﬀ the exports of non-complier goes up as the content rate goes
up, tariﬀ revenue goes up (from Proposition 3 and Figure 3). A positive eﬀect of an increased content
rate relatively increases in a mixed regime, so the value of the content rate which minimizes the welfare
level is smaller than in an all-compliers regime.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on monopoly power of the intermediate good producer and the strategic choice
of exporters whether to comply with ROO or not. We present a simple trade model that generates a
mixed regime (one exporter complies with the ROO but the other does not) in an international Cournot
competition.
The existing literature that focuses on the choice of exporters has examined perfect competition
and monopolistic competition and the eﬀect of ROO on market access and welfare. However, in view
of strategic behavior among exporters and market power of the intermediate-good producer, it seems
that the mechanism and the eﬀects of ROO need further examination. We believe that the model
developed herein oﬀers another reason of arising mixed regime from the view of strategic interaction
among exporters and a distinctive welfare implication of ROO.
Our main ﬁndings are summarized in the following three points. First, under some combinations
of content rate of ROO and the rate of the external tariﬀ, a mixed regime arises between identical
exporters. Second, if at least one exporter complies, the output and proﬁt of the ﬁnal-good producer
which is located in the importing country within the FTA is U-shaped with respect to the content
rate of the ROO. Especially, if all exporters comply, 50% of content rate of the ROO prevents the
production of the ﬁnal good producer. Lastly, surprisingly, when no exporter complies, the welfare
level of the importing country is maximum compared to any other regimes. The welfare is minimized
when complying and non-complying exporters coexist. If in many FTAs complying and non-complying
exporters coexist, the status quo may be the worst for the importing country within FTAs.
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18Appendix: proofs
Derivation of Remark: Diﬀerentiating local intermediate good price (rL(¢)) with respect to µ, we




(a + ¿)(5 ¡ 6µ ¡ 3µ2)




a(5 ¡ 4µ ¡ 4µ2)
(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)2 :





¸ 0 if µ · (1=3)(2
p
6 ¡ 3)








¸ 0 if µ · (1=2)(
p
6 ¡ 1)




The above equation implies that the price of intermediate good in both cases (C;NC) and (C;C) have
a single peked, that is, (@rL=@µ)(C;NC) = 0 at µ = (1=3)(2
p
6¡3) ' 0:63299 and (@rL=@µ)(C;C) = 0
at µ = (1=2)(
p
6 ¡ 1) ' 0:72474.




a2(1 + µ ¡ 2µ2)
b(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)






2b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
2 ¸ 0:
Thus, proﬁt of the local intermediate good producer increases due to an increase in µ.
Proof of Proposition 1: From equations (7)–(16), we derive the payoﬀ matrix of the exporters.
First, let us consider exporter 1. Comparing the cases (NC;NC) and (C;NC), the following indiﬀerence
condition holds:
¼F






51 ¡ 38µ + 39µ2 ´ f1(µ) (F.1)
Similarly, comparing the cases (NC;C) and (C;C), the following condition holds:
¼F





4µ(1 + 2µ ¡ µ2 + 4µ3)
(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)(17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2)
´ f2(µ) (F.2)
Note that exporters are symmetric, then (F.1) and (F.2) are valid for expoter 2 ((F.1) coressponds to
exporter 2’s (NC;NC) and (NC;C) cases, and (F.2) coressponds to exporter 2’s (C;NC) and (C;C)





° ¸ f1(µ) ) ¼F
1 (C;NC) ¸ ¼F
1 (NC;NC);
° · f1(µ) ) ¼F
1 (NC;NC) ¸ ¼F
1 (C;NC);
° ¸ f2(µ) ) ¼F
1 (C;C) ¸ ¼F
1 (NC;C);
° · f2(µ) ) ¼F






° ¸ f1(µ) ) ¼F
2 (NC;C) ¸ ¼F
2 (NC;NC);
° · f1(µ) ) ¼F
2 (NC;NC) ¸ ¼F
2 (NC;C);
° ¸ f2(µ) ) ¼F
2 (C;C) ¸ ¼F
2 (C;NC);
° · f2(µ) ) ¼F
2 (C;NC) ¸ ¼F
2 (C;C):
For all µ belonging to (0;1], C becomes a dominant strategy for both exporters if ° ¸ f2(µ). Second,
for all µ belonging to (0;1], NC becomes a dominant strategy for the exporters if ° · f1(µ). Finally, for
all µ belonging to (0;1], (C;NC) and (NC;C) is the equilibrium if f2(µ) ¸ ° ¸ f1(µ) holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, comparing (NC;NC) and (C;C), we obtain





3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2 ´ q1(µ):
Note that q1(µ) is non-positive for all µ belonging to [0;1], and ¼L(NC;NC) > ¼L(C;C) holds if
°(= ¿=a) > q1(µ). Thus, we can immediately ﬁnd that ¼L(NC;NC) ¸ ¼L(C;C) for all (µ;°) 2
[0;1] £ [0;¿max].
Next, comparing (NC;NC) and (C;NC), we obtain





(¡3 + µ)(1 + µ)
´ q2(µ)
Note that q2(µ) is non-positive for all µ belonging to [0;1], and ¼L(NC;NC) > ¼L(C;NC) holds if
° > q2(µ). Thus, we can immediately ﬁnd that ¼L(NC;NC) ¸ ¼L(C;NC) for all (µ;°) 2 [0;1]£[0;¿max].
Finally, comparing (C;NC) and (C;C), we obtain




4µ(¡3 + 3µ ¡ 2µ2 + 2µ3)
(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)(3 ¡ 6µ + 7µ2)
´ q3(µ)
Note that q3(µ) is non-positive for all µ belonging to [0;1], and ¼L(C;NC) > ¼L(C;C) holds if ° > q3(µ).
Thus, we can immediately ﬁnd that ¼L(C;NC) ¸ ¼L(C;C) for all (µ;°) 2 [0;1] £ [0;¿max]. Therefore,
¼L(NC;NC) ¸ ¼L(C;NC) = ¼L(NC;C) ¸ ¼L(C;C) holds for all (µ;°) 2 [0;1] £ [0;¿max]. Q.E.D.
20Proof of Proposition 3: First, we verify the shapes of y(C;C) and y(C;NC) for the content rate.





· 0 if µ · 1=2






· 0 if µ · 2
p
3 ¡ 3
> 0 if µ > 2
p
3 ¡ 3
Furthermore, we ﬁnd y(C;C)
¯
¯







































Thus, y(C;C) and y(C;NC) are U-shaped curve with respect to µ. Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium proﬁt












(a + ¿)2(¡9 + 36µ ¡ 54µ2 + 36µ3 + 7µ4)
8b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)3 : (A.2)
From equation (A.2), the real roots of equation ¡9 + 36µ ¡ 54µ2 + 36µ3 + 7µ4 = 0 are ¡(3 + 2
p
3 ) < 0
and ¡3 + 2
p





> 0 if µ > 1=2








> 0 if µ > ¡3 + 2
p
3










a2(7 ¡ 64µ + 96µ2 ¡ 64µ3 + 16µ4)









(a + ¿)2(¡7 ¡ 36µ + 54µ2 ¡ 36µ3 + 9µ4)









(a + ¿)(1 ¡ µ2) A
4b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)3; (A.5)
where A ´ (7 ¡ 2µ + 7µ2)a ¡ (17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2)¿. From equation (A.3), the real roots of equation
7 ¡ 64µ + 96µ2 ¡ 64µ3 + 16µ4 = 0 are (1=2)(2 ¡
p
3 ) < 1 and (1=2)(2 +
p






> 0 if µ < (1=2)(2 ¡
p
3 )
· 0 if µ ¸ (1=2)(2 ¡
p
3 )
From equation (A.4), the real roots of equation ¡7¡36µ+54µ2¡36µ3+9µ4 = 0 are (1=3)(3¡2
p
3) < 0
and (1=3)(3 + 2
p









From equation (A.5), we obtain
(7 ¡ 2µ + 7µ2) a ¡ (17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2) ¿ ¸ 0 ,
7 ¡ 2µ + 7µ2
17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2 ¸
¿
a









Therefore, Proposition 3 holds. Q.E.D.












a2(331 ¡ 1032µ + 1896µ2 ¡ 1696µ3 + 816µ4)






(¡725 + 1148µ ¡ 1806µ2 + 1052µ3 ¡ 645µ4) ¿2
+ 2(91 ¡ 68µ + 274µ2 ¡ 164µ3 + 171µ4) a¿




128b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
2 : (A.8)
Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) Comparing (A.6) with (A.7), we obtain
W(NC;NC) = W(C;C) ,
"
91a¿(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 ¡ 149¿2(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2
¡4a2µ(¡84 + 239µ ¡ 292µ2 + 128µ3)
#
288b(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 = 0:
This yields the following equations.
°1 =
91(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 + 3
q
¡(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2B
298(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 ; °2 =
91(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 ¡ 3
q
¡(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2B
298(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 ;
where B ´ ¡8281 ¡ 168µ + 26504µ2 ¡ 47904µ3 + 19184µ4.
We ﬁnd that °2 < 0 for all µ. Thus, we can ommit °2. Here, °1 implies that W(NC;NC) > W(C;C)
holds if ° < °1 and W(NC;NC) < W(C;C) holds if ° > °1. However, we ﬁnd that °1 > ¿max holds for
all µ belonging to [0;1]. Thus, W(NC;NC) > W(C;C) always holds.








¡ 2a¿(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 ¡
819 ¡ 1572µ + 1538µ2 ¡ 708µ3 + 99µ4¢
¡ ¿2(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 ¡
1161 ¡ 3180µ + 3142µ2 ¡ 2316µ3 + 441µ4¢
+ a2
0
@ 26811 ¡ 125388µ + 357786µ2 ¡ 652500µ3 + 877067µ4








1152b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
2(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 = 0:
23Solving the above equation with respect to ¿, we obtain
°3 = ¡
¡
3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2¢2
D ¡ 6
¡
9 ¡ 18µ + 29µ2 ¡ 20µ3 + 12µ4¢p
E
(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)




3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2¢2
D + 6
¡
9 ¡ 18µ + 29µ2 ¡ 20µ3 + 12µ4¢p
E
(3 ¡ 4µ + 4µ2)
2 (1161 ¡ 3180µ + 3142µ2 ¡ 2316µ3 + 441µ4)
;
where D ´ 819¡1572µ+1538µ2¡708µ3+99µ4 and E ´ 114705¡680724µ+1996874µ2¡3698236µ3+
4594521µ4 ¡ 3950392µ5 + 2254340µ6 ¡ 792944µ7 + 106128µ8.
We can ﬁnd that °4 < 0 for all µ belonging to [0;1]. Thus, we can ommit °4. On the other hand,
°3 > 0:7(> ¿max) always holds and °3 is a strictly increasing with respect to µ for all µ. The contour °3
implies that W(C;C) > W(C;NC) holds if ° < °3. Thus, W(C;C) > W(C;NC)(= W(NC;C)) always
holds. From step (i) and (ii), Proposition 4 holds. Q.E.D.




a2(¡14 + 61µ ¡ 90µ2 + 44µ3 + 8µ4)











(17 + 5µ ¡ 27µ2 + 31µ3 ¡ 18µ4) ¿2
+ 2(5 + 13µ ¡ 27µ2 + 23µ3 ¡ 6µ4) a¿




4b(3 ¡ 2µ + 3µ2)
3 : (A.10)




























· 0 if µ · 1=2
> 0 if µ > 1=2:
From the denominator of equation (A.10), we solve the inequality (17+5µ ¡27µ2 +31µ3 ¡18µ4)¿2 +
2(5+13µ¡27µ2+23µ3¡6µ4)a¿ +(¡7+21µ¡27µ2+15µ3+6µ4)a2 ¸ 0 with respect to ¿, and obtain





· 0 if ° · g(µ)
> 0 if ° > g(µ);
where
g(µ) ´
¡7 + 21µ ¡ 27µ2 + 15µ3 + 6µ4
¡17 ¡ 5µ + 27µ2 ¡ 31µ3 + 18µ4:







































Figure 2: Equilibrium regimes in µ-° plane.
Note that ¿max ´
7 ¡ 2µ + 7µ2
17 ¡ 14µ + 17µ2;
f1(µ) ´
4µ(1 + 3µ)
51 ¡ 38µ + 39µ2; f2(µ) ´
4µ(1 + 2µ ¡ µ2 + 4µ3)


































Figure 4: The proﬁt of local intermediate-good producer in each regime
Note that the diﬀerence between points ‘d’ and ‘e’ is 0:0418547, but the diﬀerence between













Figure 5: The proﬁt of ﬁrm L and the social welfare of the importing country (1 ¸ µ > 0)
31